A possible Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement will further integrate agricultural markets between the United States and the European Union. The elimination of tariffs and cooperation on sanitary and phytosanitary measures will promote cross-Atlantic trade. We empirically estimate the impacts of tariffs and Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) on trade in plant products between the two partners. Furthermore, we simulate trade expansions under plausible negotiation outcomes. We find that a TTIP agreement promotes cross-Atlantic trade in plant products, in both directions, by over 60% if tariffs are removed and MRLs are mutually recognized or harmonized to Codex levels.
Introduction
The first round of the proposed Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations was launched in July, 2013, with the aim to improve market access, regulatory coherence, and modes of cooperation between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) (European Commission, 2015a) . Although the TTIP negotiations are ongoing, official press releases suggest that the removal of tariffs and the minimization of the impacts of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are top priorities. For example, an EU position paper outlines that one of EU's goals is to "remove nearly all customs duties on EU-US trade" (European Commission, 2015b) . In addition, both sides strive for a SPS chapter in the potential TTIP agreement that "builds upon the key principles of the SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO)" (European Commission, 2013) .
Average customs duties are generally low between the US and the EU. Nevertheless, tariffs are higher for agricultural products than for manufactured goods (Josling and Tangermann, 2015) . Non-tariff measures including the SPS measures tend to be more stringent in the EU than in the US. For instance, the EU enforces tougher food safety standards for aflatoxin residues in food items (Xiong and Beghin, 2012) , pesticide residues in food products (Li and Beghin, 2014) , and growth additives in livestock industries such as hormones and ractopamine (Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina, 1998; Alemanno and Capodieci, 2012) . In addition, the EU adopts stricter regulations on emerging biotechnologies such as genetically modified crops (Moschini, 2008) .
Several studies in the literature have assessed the economic impacts of a forthcoming TTIP agreement, with emphasis on different products and policy reforms. In a report for the European Parliament, Bureau et al. (2014) project that the removal of tariffs and the 25% reduction in non-tariff measures will raise EU agri-food export to the US by 60% and import from the US by 120%. Beghin, Bureau, and Gohin (2014) find that the removal of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas in the biofuel and feedstock markets will boost the ethanol and biodiesel sector in the US and the sugar and isoglucose sector in the EU. Using a computational general equilibrium model, Cororaton and Orden (2016) report modest gains in agricultural exports in both economies if the TTIP agreement does not substantially reduce non-tariff barriers. In an econometric analysis, Arita, Mitchell, and Beckman (2015) find that non-tariff measures are highly restrictive for agri-food exporters from both the US and the EU. Akgul, Hertel, and Villoria (2016) examine the possible removal of an EU ban on hormone-treated beef within a GTAP model accounting for productivity difference among beef processors. They find that beef trade across the Atlantic would increase by over $400 million a year.
In this article, we focus on two sets of policy reforms that can result from a potential TTIP agreement: the elimination of tariffs, and the cooperation on Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) that govern pesticide residue concentrations in plant products. First, we deploy an econometric model to estimate the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade in plant products between the two trade partners. Second, we simulate the economic gains to US and EU exporters under two plausible TTIP negotiation outcomes: (1) the removal of tariffs and the mutual recognition of MRLs; (2) the removal of tariffs and the compliance to Codex MRLs as recommended by the WTO.
We find that the tariffs significantly constrain cross-Atlantic trade in plant products.
Moreover, we find that the MRLs in both markets raise costs borne by foreign suppliers on the one hand and sustain import demand on the other. The simulation results suggest that the elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 38%, or $940 million a year. Finally, the mutual recognition of cross-Atlantic MRLs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by 13%, or $79 million a year, and US export of plant products to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a
year. The alignment of each country's MRLs on Codex MRLs expands across-Atlantic trade even more. Overall, the gain in export revenue is over 60% for both the US and the EU.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current markets and policy instruments pertaining to plant products in the US and the EU. Section 3 uses an econometric model to quantify the impact of tariffs and MRLs on the bilateral trade between US, EU, and other trading partners. Section 4 describes data sources and presents estimation results. Section 5 projects the economic gains from a potential TTIP agreement under different policy scenarios. Section 6 concludes the article and suggests directions for future research.
An overview of trade in plant products and regulatory regimes across the Atlantic
Cross-Atlantic trade in plant products is worth more than $3 billion. 3 In 2012, US import value of plant products from the EU was $620 million, while US export of plant products to the EU totaled $2.5 billion. The customs duties are generally low in either market. Specifically, the simple average tariff for plant products is about 4% in the US and 10% in the EU. However, sanitary and phytosanitary measures diverge significantly across the Atlantic Josling and Tangermann, 2015) .
In particular, the regulatory regime governing pesticide residues differs substantially between the two markets. The primary policy instrument is the Maximum Residue Limit, which sets the maximum permissible rate of concentration for a specific chemical residue in a specific product. The Codex Alimentarius, a body under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, develops international MRLs based on science.
However, the Codex standards are voluntary in nature, as the WTO acknowledges member countries' sovereign right in setting their own standards. Nevertheless, The SPS Agreement of the WTO encourages its members to use CODEX MRLs whenever they are available.
Neither the US nor the EU is currently in compliance with the Codex standards. In particular, Li and Beghin (2014) find that the MRLs in the US do not exactly follow Codex recommendations, but on aggregate are pretty close to them. However, the MRLs implemented in the EU are considerably more restrictive than the Codex counterparts (see the data section below for summary values).
An econometric analysis of the US-EU trade in plant products

The econometric specification
In this section, we provide an econometric model to characterize the cross-Atlantic trade in plant products. Specifically, we extend the model developed by Xiong and Beghin (2014) with emphasis on the US-EU partnership. In the original model, Xiong and Beghin (2014) use the MRL stringency index of Li and Beghin (2014) to measure the restrictiveness of MRLs by product and by nation. In particular, the MRL stringency index is averaged across MRLs targeting all pesticides and chemicals applicable to a specific product. A higher MRL stringency index indicates a more restrictive MRL policy. If a country defers its MRLs to Codex, the stringency index takes the value of one.
More importantly, the model in Xiong and Beghin (2014) accounts for the impacts of MRLs on both the supply side and the demand side of the market. They find empirical evidence that a more stringent MRL imposes extra costs on foreign suppliers on one hand, and stimulates additional demand via quality assurance or information disclosure on the other. With focus on the US-EU partnership, we extend the model by allowing MRLs in the EU and the US to have different impacts than the MRLs adopted by other developed nations. (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) . 5
Data features and the estimation procedure
We utilize the data set in Xiong and Beghin (2014) . importing markets are less restrictive than the EU but tougher than the US or Codex. Although the MRL information is frequently updated by regulatory bodies across the world, the overall stringency did not vary substantially from 2008 to 2012. A prominent feature of bilateral trade records at disaggregated product levels is that zero trade flows are pervasive. In the dataset, more than 80% of the 315,397 observations correspond to the absence of trade. To account for the large portion of missing trade, we use the two-step Heckman procedure to estimate the regression equation. Following Xiong and Beghin (2014) , we choose the common religion variable as the excluded variable to facilitate the identification of the Heckman procedure. Furthermore, to allow heterogeneity in the self-selection process across different agricultural sectors, we also include the interaction terms of the excluded variable and the fixed effects at the HS-2 chapter level.
Results and discussions
Estimation results and marginal effects
We focus on the marginal effects of the tariffs and MRLs in this section, while leaving the estimated coefficients to Appendix C. 7 Specifically, Table 2 shows the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the intensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the trade volumes given 7 One can verify from Appendix C that the estimated coefficients of other trade costs bear the expected signs, except for the effect of common border on the probability of trade partnership. that bilateral trade already takes place. We later define the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the extensive margin. Table 2 , tariffs significantly impede agricultural trade cross the Atlantic.
Table 2. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the intensive margin US as exporter EU as exporter 3 rd country exporter US as importer
As shown in
The tariff elasticity of US import from the EU is over -7, and the tariff elasticity of US export to the EU is -2.4. In an earlier study, Bureau et al. (2014) also find that the tariff elasticity of cross-Atlantic agricultural trade is well above one. With US-EU trade flows excluded, the marginal effect of tariffs on trade volumes among third countries is nearly one.
Next, we attend to the marginal effects of MRLs in Table 2 . We find that the MRL policies in either the US or the EU exhibit dual effects. That is, the MRLs impose extra costs on foreign suppliers as well as sustain demand for imports via information disclosure or quality assurance. In particular, the MRLs in the US affect market participants more profoundly than the MRLs in the EU. The plausible reason is that the harmonization of MRLs among EU member states has reduced the disruptions of MRLs within the common market. In addition, we find that the MRLs adopted by other high-income nations generally promote imports of plant products.
However, the positive trade-cost effects of MRLs implemented by third nations are unexpected.
One possible explanation is that these MRLs impose more costs onto domestic producers than foreign suppliers. As a result, a more stringent MRL regime further diminishes the competitiveness of the agricultural sectors. 8
As a complement to Table 2 , Table 3 presents the marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the extensive margin of trade. That is, the impacts on the likelihood of trade partnership.
The effects along the extensive margin are of particular interest when certain policies impose substantial costs on foreign suppliers and therefore drive vulnerable exporters out of the market altogether. The reduction or removal of these prohibitive measures expands the variety of products traded in the world market or the number of nations participating in international trade. Table 3 , tariffs lower the likelihood of the occurrence of trade across the Atlantic. The result suggests that the elimination of tariffs will expand the variety of plant products traded between the US and the EU. Moreover, the increase in variety will be more substantial in the US market than in the EU market, probably because the diversity of EU imports is more constrained by non-tariff measures in the EU. We also find that the MRLs in the US affect the propensity of both US importers and EU exporters. In contrast, the MRLs in the EU do not affect EU-US partnership and even make EU's sourcing from third countries more likely. 9 As in Table 2 , we find no evidence that the MRLs enforced by third nations suppress the probability of trade.
Table 3. Marginal effects of tariffs and MRLs along the extensive margin US as exporter EU as exporter 3 rd country exporter US as importer
As shown in
In summary, the marginal effects in Table 2 and Table 3 provide a quantitative assessment of the impacts of tariffs and MRLs on the across-Atlantic trade in plant products. The overall effects of trade liberalization can be derived by combining the marginal effects along both margins of trade. In the next subsection, we simulate the potential gains to agricultural exporters in the US and the EU, under possible policy environments implied by a forthcoming TTIP agreement.
Simulation results and policy implications
The gradual removal of all import duties and the cooperation on non-tariff measures are high priorities in the ongoing TTIP negotiations. Although a duty-free market across the Atlantic is a preferred outcome by both sides, the risk perceptions and assessments of other public policies such as the SPS measures differ greatly between the US and the EU markets. We consider two plausible policy scenarios resulting from the TTIP negations. In the first scenario, tariffs are eliminated and the both markets consider the MRLs effective in the other market equivalent to the domestic standards (i.e., mutual recognition). In the second scenario implied by the TTIP agreement, cross-Atlantic tariffs are removed and both the US and the EU defer their MRLs to the Codex counterparts. Under this negotiation outcome, the TTIP agreement would be consistent with the SPS Agreement and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement of the WTO. Table 4 shows the simulated trade expansions due to a TTIP agreement in both scenarios. 
Gains to EU exporters
From tariff elimination 49% 49% From MRL changes 13% 21% Note: The trade expansions account for the increase in trade volumes (or the intensive margin) and the increase in trade likelihood (or the extensive margin). Table 4 , the elimination of tariffs promotes US export to the EU by 38%, or $940 million a year based on the trade record as of 2012. Similarly, the tariff removal boosts US import from the EU by 49%, or $300 million a year. Note that the simulated trade expansions do not incorporate potential feedback effects from field crops to processed food items such as meat and dairy products along the supply chain.
As shown in
Next, we discuss the expansions of trade induced by cross-Atlantic cooperation on MRL policies. Under the first negotiation outcome, the US and the EU mutually recognize the MRLs adopted in the other market. The equivalence of MRLs exempts exporters from incurring additional costs in order to penetrate the other market. We expect that US exporters benefit more from mutual recognition than EU exporters because the current MRL regime is tougher in the EU than in the US (recall Table 1 ). At the same time, the mutual recognition might lead EU consumers to perceive US imports as inferior. Such changes of risk or quality perceptions in the EU are likely to weaken the demand for US imports. As shown in Table 4 , the mutual recognition of MRLs raises US export to the EU by 25%, or $635 million a year, and US import from the EU by 13%, or $79 million a year.
Under the second TTIP negotiation outcome, both the US and the EU endorse the Codex MRLs. This implies a substantial relaxation of MRLs in the EU and a slight strengthening of MRLs in the US (recall Table 1 ). The adherence to a common set of MRLs spares exporters from overcoming extra hurdles when selling across the Atlantic. As in the case of mutual recognition, we expect US exporters to gain more than EU exporters because a more stringent regulatory regime is currently effective in the EU. In addition, the relaxation of MRLs in the EU suppresses EU demand, as European consumers adjust their risk and quality perceptions. Similarly, the strengthening of MRLs in the US is likely to enhance the demand for plant products in the US.
According to Table 4 , US export to the EU increases by 26%, slightly higher than in the case of mutual recognition. The reason is that European consumers perceive US imports as less inferior when the US strengths its MRLs to meet Codex recommendations. Finally, we find that US import from the EU rises by 21%, higher than13% under mutual recognition. The reason is that the US compliance with Codex enhances US demand for plant products. Overall, the cross-Atlantic trade in plant products expands by more than 60%, in either direction, in response to a comprehensive TTIP agreement that addresses both tariffs and non-tariff measures. 10
Conclusions
The ongoing TTIP negotiations between the US and the EU are expected to bring forth a broadbased trade agreement that further integrates the two markets. The proposed cooperation ranges from the gradual removal of bilateral customs duties to the convergence of regulatory regimes across the Atlantic. The agricultural sectors on both sides will be profoundly affected by a TTIP agreement as policies affecting the agri-food industries diverge substantially between the two markets.
We investigate the impact of a potential TTIP agreement on the cross-Atlantic trade in plant products, with emphasis on the elimination of tariffs and the convergence of MRLs that regulate pesticide residues. Deploying a state-of-the-art econometric model, we find that the elimination of tariffs boosts US import of plant products from the EU by $300 million a year and US export of plant products to the EU $940 million a year. Furthermore, the mutual recognition of MRLs raises US import of plant products from the EU by $79 million or $130 million a year, and US export of plant products to the EU by $635 million or $661 million a year. The endorsement of Codex MRLs by the US and the EU has the potential to release even more trade opportunities.
We foresee several extensions to the current research. First, the proposed model can be used to evaluate other policies interfering with agricultural trade across the Atlantic. For example, one could consider the reconciliation of SPS measures governing food and feed additives and antibiotic residues in animal products. Second, the possible trade-diversion effects of a TTIP agreement are of great interest to stakeholders and policy makers beyond the US and the EU. In particular, it is worth exploring whether the expansion of cross-Atlantic trade is at the expense of diminished export opportunities faced by less developed nations. In addition, future research could go beyond trade growths and investigate the welfare implications of the TTIP agreement. 58,603 315,397 Note: The notation ⊗ represents the interaction with the following indicator variable. The year-specific importers' fixed effects and the year-specific and chapter-specific exporters' fixed effects are included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Chapter-specific common religion variables are used as the excluded variables in the Heckman two-step procedure. Notations **, and *** denote significance levels at 5% and 1% respectively.
Table C. Estimated coefficients of high-income OECD' imports of plant products
